SPACE: FINAL FRONTIER, NEW COMMERCIAL DESTINATION? (PART 1)
This summer's essay series will begin with a two-part look at aspects of NASA, the nation's space programs/policy, and
how politics, changing federal budget priorities, the end of the space shuttle era, technological advances and other factors are leading to a nascent commercial space industry in the U.S. Call it a transition,
a "fork in the road," or a new chapter in the Space Age, but recent changes in policy and practice mean that the U.S. may soon be looking back at an era when space was the exclusive domain of governments and looking ahead to an
era of greater commercial involvement in space transport, travel and/or exploration.
As with past essays, the story will be interactive in the sense that visitors may simply read the text or instead follow
links, watch videos or look over photos and diagrams to gain a more in-depth understanding of the topics presented. Footnotes and a bibliography will be included at
the end of the essay, and a link to a glossary of space-related terminology is available for use as necessary. (CLICK HERE to reach the glossary.) Comments, corrections or other
input from visitors from within the local aerospace industry (or anyone else!) are welcome and may be e-mailed to
spaceessay@dorothyswebsite.org.
Endeavour arrives in Los Angeles. The space shuttle Endeavour, atop the shuttle carrier aircraft, lands at
Los Angeles International Airport, concluding the final ferry flight of the space shuttle era. Endeavour will be on permanent display at the California Science Center in Exposition Park. Photo credit: NASA/Matt Hedges,
September 21, 2012.
Thousands watched last year as the space shuttle Endeavour circled Southern California atop its carrier aircraft (and later as it travelled through the streets of Los Angeles) en
route to its final destination at the California Science Center. With the last shuttle flight having taken place in 2011, the very public completion of the shuttle fleet's 30-year mission (the first shuttle flight took place
in 1981), drew to a close an era marked by both great triumph (the completion of the International Space Station, or ISS) and great tragedy (the loss ot shuttles Challenger in 1986 and Columbia
in 2003).
The end of the program also posed something of a dilemma for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, www.nasa.gov) and the U.S. Just as the ISS was being completed
and reaching its full potential as a space-based laboratory, the U.S. was to be without any domestic capability for sending crew or cargo to the station and fulfilling its obligations to its international ISS partners (and having to rely
primarily on the country's astronauts booking "rides" on Russian spacecraft to the ISS). Part of the solution came through NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. Through the program
NASA went outside the regular government contracting process to develop agreements with two (private) commercial partners for space-bound cargo transportation systems to the ISS. Agreements were based on the Space Act, the original
legislation on which NASA was founded in the late 1950s. Those agreements, and other follow-up agreements which are contributing to the establishment of a commercial space industry in the U.S., will be discussed at greater length below.
But perhaps the dilemma is only one sign of other management and strategic problems being encountered with NASA. Part of the situation may be due to difficulties in reconciling multi-billion dollar
programs taking decades to plan and complete with annual budget/appropriation cycles in Washington, constantly-shifting political winds and constant turnover in Congress, and four-year presidential cycles producing administrations with varying views on space
policy. Much of this was articulated in a 2012 report by the National Research Council which summarized some of the issues being encountered by saying:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is at a transitional point in its history and is facing a set of circumstances that it has not faced in combination
before. The agency's budget, although level-funded in constant-year dollars, is under considerable stress, servicing increasingly expensive missions and a large, aging infrastructure established at the height of the Apollo program. Other than the long-range goal of sending humans to Mars, there is no
strong, compelling national vision for the human spaceflight program, which is arguably the centerpiece of NASA's spectrum of mission areas. The lack of national consensus on NASA's most publicly visible mission, along with . . . budget uncertainty, has resulted in the lack of strategic focus
necessary for national agencies operating in today's budgetary reality. As a result, NASA's distribution of resources may be out of sync with what it can achieve relative to what is has been asked to do.
NASA now faces major challenges in nearly all of its primary endeavors - human spaceflight, Earth and space science, and aeronautics. While the agency has undertaken new efforts to procure commercial transportation to resupply the International Space
Station (ISS) and has also intiated an effort to commercially procure crew transportation as well, the agency currently lacks a means of launching astronauts on a U.S. spacecraft to Earth orbit, where the agency operates the ISS, which was built at considerable time, effort and expense.
Although gaps in U.S. human spaceflight capability have existed in the past, several other factors, in combination, make this a unique period for NASA. These include a lack of consensus on the next steps in the development of human spaceflight, increasing financial
pressures, an aging infrastructure, and the emergence of additional space-capable nations - some friendly, some potentially unfriendly. (n1)
In order to understand how this all has come about, it is probably necessary to step back and take a brief look at the founding of NASA, its overall
development and major missions over the last 50 years, the transition from the Apollo era to the space shuttle, and the construction and purpose of the International Space Station. This first part of the two-part series will then conclude with a
brief look at the new commercial agreements, next steps in the development of not only cargo but crew transportation and NASA's next exploration program, and the possible emergence of an entirely separate sector of the commercial spaceflight industry, that of suborbital
flight.
An Introduction to the Space Age
The first satellite launched into orbit was the Soviet Union's Sputnik (above left). Buzz Aldrin and the U.S. flag on the moon (above right). Astronaut Buzz Aldrin, lunar module pilot of the first
lunar landing mission, poses for a photograph beside the deployed U.S. flag during an Apollo 11 Extravehicular Activity (EVA) on the lunar surface. The Lunar Module (LM) is on the left, and the footprints of the astronauts are
clearly visible in the soil of the moon. Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong, commander, took this picture with a 70mm Hasselblad lunar surface camera, July 1969. Photo credits: NASA.
For centuries space has been the realm of scientists and science fiction writers, those wondering what would be found beyond the earth's atmosphere or imagining travel to
distant planets or galaxies. But the world's entry into the Space Age was more a matter of Cold War rhetoric and realities, combined with an event which caused alarm throughout the United States. In October of 1957, the Soviet Union placed the
184-pound satellite Sputnik (pictured above left) into orbit. In today's world it may be difficult to understand how that event could be called "one of the most
disruptive singular events in the history of the United States." (n2) But the end of World War II had come only slightly more than a decade prior to the satellite's launch. The U.S. and
the Soviet Union were in the heat of a Cold War battle in which each side was vying to claim superiority for its economic and political systems and ideologies. The U.S. for the most part considered itself to
be more advanced and technologically superior to the Soviet Union, a notion shattered with Soviets being able to lay claim to the first satellite in orbit.
One writer, in describing the "race" which led to the U.S. eventually landing the first man on the moon, said of events which took place in the Soviet Union
in the days immediately following Sputnik's launch that:
[Soviet leader] Nikita Khrushchev knew a good thing when he saw it. The second-day stories in Pravda and every other Soviet
publication were blockbusters. In the United States, it seemed that everyone from schoolchildren to newspaper reporters to politicians was bemoaning national failure. The Soviet Union had a major propaganda victory on its hands . . . and it knew how
to play that game too well.
The immediate response on Khrushchev's mind was what to do next . . . Sputnik 2 roared into space on November 3, 1957, and the world gasped anew at the 1,120 pound behemoth. This was no simple satellite, though it
was another of the Chief Designer's one-month wonders. A passenger was on board Earth's second artificial moon. Her name was Laika. The mongrel dog would survive seven days before her oxygen supply ran out, providing the first proof that life
could be sustained in zero gravity. There was another message here too. The Russians clearly were looking ahead to putting a man in space." (n3)
The reaction in Washington was swift, and in July of 1958 Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 (sometimes referred to as The Space Act). As a result, NASA came into being in October of that same year. In contrast to some of today's 1,000-page pieces of legislation, the Space Act was
a simple document declaring that "it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind," and that "the general welfare and security of the United
States require that adequate provision be made for aeronautics and space activities." (n4) The act stated that the aeronautical and space activities of the U.S. should be conducted to contribute materially to one or more of
six objectives:
- The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space
- The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles
- The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies and living organisms
through space
- The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the
problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes
- The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in
the application thereof to the conduct the peaceful activties within and outside the atmosphere
- The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or
significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to
the civilian agency established to direct and control nonmilitary
aeronautical and space activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or significance to that agency (n5)
Over the years the act has been amended several times.
CLICK HERE to view a copy of the original document, and CLICK HERE to view the act as amended.
The emphasis on "peaceful purposes" was placed in the text for two reasons: "There was the fear that space would become a military battlfield or provide platforms from which lethal
weapons could be launched at targets on earth, . . . and to protect the freedom for satellites to fly over foreign territory . . . The term 'peaceful' in relation to outer space activities was interpreted by the U.S. [and apparently by others] to mean
'non-aggressive' rather than 'non-military.' In international law this [means] that all military uses are permitted and lawful as long as they do not engage the threat or the use of force." (n6) Following the passage of the Space
Act and the founding of NASA, the U.S. also spearheaded the effort to establish an ad hoc committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The committee became a regular committee of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1959 and still
exists under the aegis of the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (www.unoosa.org) today. More information about the COPUOS can be found at
www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html.
The first decade of NASA's existence was galvanized in part by the Cold War reaction to continued Soviet forays into space, but primarily by the words of John F. Kennedy in a speech before Congress
in 1961. In that speech he said, "I believe this nation should commit itself to achieving a goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth." (n7) Though Kennedy did not live to see the
objective accomplished, the crew of Apollo 11 landed the Eagle Lunar Module (LM) on the surface of the moon in July of 1969 (pictured above right) and returned safely to earth. In the words of Neil Armstrong, it was "one small step for man . . . one giant step
for mankind." In addition to the Apollo 11 moon landing, there were five other moon landings through 1972 prior to the end of the Apollo program. No U.S. astronauts have been back to the moon since that time.
The Shuttle Lifts Off
The space shuttle Columbia began a new era of space transportation when it lifted off from the Kennedy Space Center on April 12, 1981. (above left) The reusable
orbiter returned from Earth orbit two days later. Designed to land like a plane, the shuttle is pictured above right with its landing gear in position near touchdown on a dry lakebed at Edwards Air Force Base in the desert area of
Southern California. Photo credits: NASA.
After NASA's founding in the late 1950s, the agency's funding escalated rapidly until in the mid-1960s it represented as much as three to four percent of the federal budget. However, other matters began to occupy the nation.
The war in Vietnam, social unrest in the U.S., shifting political thought, and even the space program's own success vis-a-vis the Soviets, might all be pointed to as factors which intervened in reducing the agency's budget to a level between one-half to one percent of the federal
budget, a level which as remained farily constant in years since. (n8) As the Nixon Administration came into office, no formal plans were in place to address what would replace the Apollo program once it ended. In the early 1970s, when the debate on the
Space Transportation System (STS, as the shuttle is officially known) was taking place, the STS became "NASA's last hope for maintaining [a] human spaceflight program" (n9) since it had failed to get support for its other programs, including a permanent
space station for which the STS was to provide service. The focus came on lowering the cost of launches by developing the reusable shuttle system through which a capability would develop for providing a "more routine access to space." (n10) Several sources indicate that final approval from the Nixon administration
came for a variety of (not necessarily science-related) reasons, including the fact that "starting the shuttle in 1972 would produce jobs in states key to Nixon's reelection," (n11) and that Nixon "didn't want to go down in history as the president who ended the era of man in space."
(n12)
With Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 and the first space shuttle flight in 1981 came a new era in space policy for the U.S. Space was very much a focus of the Reagan administration in many ways and for many purposes, including greater
commercial/space business opportunities. In January of 1981, "in the same spot where President Kennedy had issued his lunar landing challenge, Reagan announced [his] new space initiative . . . [by saying]:
The Space Age is barely a quarter of a century old. But already we've pushed civilization forward with our advances in science and
technology. Opportunities and jobs will multiply as we cross new thresholds of knowledge and reach deeper into the unknown . . .
American has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for
peaceful, economic, scientific gain. Tonight, I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within a decade.
A space station will permit quantum leaps in our research in science, communications, in metals, and in life-saving medicines which could be made only in space." (n13)
The era of the space station had begun - sort of.
As far back as the 1980s, themes which have continued to weave their way in and out through U.S. space policy and practice emerged; again, some may be attributed to the nature of politics, others to the nature of planning multi-billion
dollar large-scale projects in new/unknown environments. The STS program ended up producing fewer flights than expected, and at a greater cost than initially projected. The Challenger accident in January of 1986 in which the shuttle exploded shortly after liftoff, killing everyone aboard,
put a temporary halt to the program. Notions of the ISS as a commercial enterprise, as a permanently-inhabited outpost from which other expeditions could be launched, and as a station for various types of research facilities came in and out of favor. In a 1990 speech, George Bush
(Sr.) suggested the goal of placing humans on Mars prior to NASA's 50th Anniverary, and though long a goal of space exploration for many, the idea went nowhere (but the theme was picked up again by George W. Bush in 2004 and will be discussed a bit later). By that time there had been a series of
redesigns for the ISS which raised the initial Reagan-era estimate of $8 billion over a decade . . . to $30 billion, and some sources were predicting that the total price (including operating costs) would reach as high as $120 billion." (n14)
Alhough some agreements for the construction, use and operation of the ISS as an international facility were signed as early as 1988, a milestone in ISS history was reached a decade later in 1998 with the signing of the International Agreement on Space Station
Operation (with subsequent corresponding bilateral agreements). The agreement was signed with international partners Japan, Canada, members of the European Space Agency and (in what might have been unimaginable at the time of NASA's founding) Russia, establishing the final framework for cooperation among the partners on the design, development, operation and utilization of the space station. (n15)
(The new agreement reflected changes to the space station program resulting from significant Russian participation in the program and design changes undertaken since a prior 1993 agreement). The first portion of the space station began to be continuously inhabited in 2000 and was constructed over the course
of the next decade. The final resupply trip of the shuttle to the ISS took place in 2011. The video below shows the sequence in which the construction of the ISS took place, with a timeline visible (though faint) at the bottom of the image.
Not able to see the video above? If the video above does not appear, you can also try
the following link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgfWH3g9kpY.
The ISS represents a remarkable achievement in not only engineering and construction, but also international collaboration. About the size of a football field, it is the "largest orbiting man-made object . . . composed of about one million pounds of
hardware brought to orbit over the course of a decade." (n16) About "37 shuttle flights and 1,000 hours of space walks, or 126 EVAs, went into its construction." (n17) The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 designated the U.S. portion of the ISS as a
National Laboratory. Facilities aboard the ISS are designed to support "ongoing research in microgravity, studies of other aspects of the space environment, tests of new technology and long-term space operations. The facilities also enable a permanent crew of up to six astronauts to maintain their physical health
standards while conducting many different types of research, including experiments in biotechnology, combustion science, fluid physics, and materials science on behalf of ground-based researchers. [In addition], the ISS has the capability to support research on materials and other technologies to see how they
react in a space environment." (n18) The station's main page within the NASA website can be found by clicking the following link: www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/index.html. An interactive reference guide for the ISS (flash
required) can be found at www.nasa.gov/externalflash/ISSRG.
The International Space Station (ISS) in May 2011 (pictured above). Backdropped by Earth's horizon and the blackness of space, the ISS is featured in this image photographed by a crew member of the space shuttle Endeavour after the station and the shuttle began their post-undocking
separation. Photo credit: NASA.
As of 2012, information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicated that about $48 billion hs been directly invested by NASA in the ISS. (n19) In 1995, NASA expected ISS assembly to be finished in 2002, and the finished station in use through 2015, with the
shuttle serving as the means of transporting crew, hardware, and supplies through the end of the station's life. However, as it became clear that the earlier anticipated schedule would not be met, matters were complicated by the second shuttle tragedy, the loss of the shuttle Columbia upon re-entry in February 2003. In the aftermath of the loss of the Columbia,
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB's) independent investigation lasted about seven months. (n20) In addition to describing the physical causes of the accident, investigators also acknowledged that the accident "was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA's history and the human
space flight program's culture . . . [and] in its findings place[d] as much weight on [those] causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident." (n21) Though the Board supported the shuttle fleet's "return to flight at the
earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, . . . [they also expressed the] conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent
risks." (n22). One outcome of the accident, report and subsequent evaluation was the realization and acknowledgement that the aging shuttle system would soon need to be replaced.
Looking Toward the End of the Shuttle Era
The Bush (George W.) Administration wasted no time in coming up with a plan, announced in January 2004, called "A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration." Key elements of the plan called for:
- A return of the space shuttle to flight with the focus of completing the ISS, then retiring the shuttle as soon as assembly
was complete;
- A return to exploration beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO, see explanation in 'LEO/Suborbital Flight' section below) and an
extended human expedition back to the Moon by no later than 2020;
- Robotic exploration of Mars to prepare the way for future human exploration;
- Developing a new crew exploration vehicle to provide crew transportation for missions beyond Low-Earth Orbit with
full operational capability by 2014 (at that time the expected life of the ISS was to be through 2015);
- Acquiring cargo transportation to support missions to and from the ISS as soon as practical and affordable, and crew
transportation after the shuttle is retired, with an emphasis on both international
and commercial participation. (n23)
In a cover letter introducing the plan, then-NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe called the plan "a bolder framework for exploring our solar system . . .[which] will put in place revolutionary technologies
and capabilities for the future." He also wrote that "I cannot overstate how much NASA will change in the coming years as this plan is implemented." (n24)
Implementation of the plan began in three ways: the return of shuttle flights and continued work on the ISS, the initiation of the Constellation program in 2005, and in 2006 the signing of the first Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) demonstration
program agreements for commercial cargo resupply operations for the ISS. The NASA-developed Constellation system was envisioned as a system consisting of the Orion Crew capsule, the Ares I crew launch vehicle, the Ares V heavy lift launch vehicle for expeditions beyond Low-Earth orbit, the Altair Lunar Lander
for travel to and from the moon's surface and surface systems for lunar exploration. The system also was intended as a back-up capable of ferrying crew and cargo to and from the ISS if commercial transportation services were not available. Again, as in the past, the war in Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and a slowing economy
intervened. Budget levels which were anticipated in 2004 never materialized, and the schedule for the project slipped, with an accompanying increase in cost.
In 2009, the Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, also known as the Augustine Committee, concluded that "the U.S. human spaceflight plans program in place . . . appeared to be on an unsustainable trajectory and that it was pursuing goals
that did not match allocated resources, . . . [and] that there were insufficient funds . . . to support both the Constellation program and the likely extension of the ISS." (n25) As a result, in February 2010, the Constellation program was cancelled by the Obama Administration. Any thought of a return to
the Moon was eliminated. Instead, the new exploration goals as articulated in the new 2010 Space Policy of the United State of America became to, "by 2025, begin crewed missions beyond the moon, including sending humans to an asteroid, [and] by the mid-2030s [to] send humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to earth."
(n26) [NOTE: To help place potential destinations for both human and robotic exploration in context and gain a bit of additional information, an interactive Flash-based NASA page is recommended. NASA's Interactive Global Exploration Roadmap can be found at
www.nasa.gov/externalflash/globalexplorationroadmap. When viewed in July 2013 there was an indication on the page that it had last been updated in 2011, so a few bits of information have changed, but overall
it paints a very understandable picture of areas for potential exploration, exploration programs in place, and the significance of many of the destinations. It could take anywhere from a few minutes to an hour to view in depth.] By that time close to $12 billion had been spent on the Constellation program (n27).
One element of the cancelled Constellation program, the Orion crew capsule, was retained as the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), one half of the new MPCV/SLS (Space Launch System) which became the architecture for the new generation of human spaceflight vehicles in development now and expected to be operational by 2021 to
meet U.S. Space Policy directives.
In that same 2010 time frame as the cancellation of the Constellation and the articulation of the new U.S. Space Policy, the
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 extended the expected life of the ISS through 2020 and required the NASA Administrator to take all actions necessary to ensure its safe and effective operation. This became part of the dilemma alluded to at the beginning of the essay: with the retirement of the shuttle pending for
2011, and with no new U.S. crew/cargo launch capability expected until at least 2021, how were U.S. crew and cargo needs to the ISS to be met? It is in the answer to this that some of the ongoing efforts at creating a domestic commercial space industry can be found.
The STS-135 patch represents the space shuttle Atlantis embarking on its mission to resupply the International Space Station. Atlantis is centered over elements of the NASA emblem depicting how the space shuttle has been at
the heart of NASA for 30 years. It also pays tribute to the entire NASA and contractor team that made possible all the shuttles' accomplishments. Omega, the last letter in the Greek alphabet, recognizes that the mission is the last flight of the space shuttle program.
"As part of its redirection to the human space flight program, NASA began to aggressively advocate development of a commercial crew program to ferry astrounauts to the ISS." (n28) Current commercial crew development efforts will be
discussed at greater length in the second part of the essay. Efforts at developing a commercial cargo resupply system actually began under the Bush Administration. In 2005, NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program at the Johnson Space Center. The objectives of the program are "to further
the implementation of U.S. space policy with investments to stimulate the commercial space industry, facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo and crew space transportation capabilities with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, cost-effective access to LEO (low-earth orbit), and create a market environment
in which commercial space transportation services are available to government and private sector customers. NASA believes the eventual availability of safe, reliable and economic service to LEO through the private sector will help NASA achieve the Nation's space exploration goals following
retirement of the space shuttle thereby allowing NASA to focus on developing new space transportation capabilities to support exploration beyond the LEO." (n29)
The first phase of commercial cargo procurement efforts were demonstrations of commercial cargo systems under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. Agreeements known as Space Act Agreeements were signed with two commercial companies
under the COTS program: Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) in 2006, and Orbital Sciences Corporation in 2008. Space Act Agreements are "transactions other than contracts, leases and cooperative agreements. Congress granted NASA the authority to enter into these types of transactions in the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 to give the agency greater flexibility in achieving its mission . . . These arrangements differ from Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contracts in that they do not include requirements that generally apply to government contracts entered into under the authority of the FAR." (n30) Under
the Space Act Agreements, "both NASA and the partners themselves act as investors . . . The partners (and their other private investors) are investors because they partake in the financial burden, and stand to reap the financial benefits, of developing a proven commercial space transportation capability that they can
sell to NASA and other customers. NASA's intended benefit is the further availability of commercial providers to enable less-expensive cargo transportation costs and [eliminate] the operations burden for routine LEO transportation." (n31)
In the next phase of the development of a commercial cargo capability (and keeping in mind that at the time the expected lifespan of the ISS was through 2015), Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts were awarded for resupply of the ISS to both
SpaceX and Orbital. In December 2008, NASA ordered 12 CRS flights from SpaceX valued at $1.59 billion, and eight CRS flights from Orbital valued at $1.88 billion. (n32) Augmented by agreements in place with European and Japanese space consortiums for use of their unmanned vehicles for cargo resupply to the
ISS from 2012 - 2016, the schedule for cargo resupply to the ISS as of March 2012 is included below.
The shift to an increasing emphasis on commercial space activity for LEO activities was explained at greater length in a 2009 report entitled "Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation." In that
report it was suggested that "The United States needs a means of launching astronauts to low-Earth orbit, but it does not necessarily have to be provided by the government. As we move from the complex, reusable shuttle back to a simpler, smaller
capsule, it is appropriate to consider turning this transport service over to the commercial sector. This approach is not without technical and programmatic risks, but it creates the possibility of
lower operating costs for the system and potentially accelerates the availability of U.S. access to low-Earth orbit . . . Establishing these commercial opportunities could increase launch volume and potentially lower costs to
NASA and all other launch service customers. This would have the additional benefit of focusing NASA on a more challenging role, permitting it to concentrate its efforts where its inherent capability resides: in developing cutting-edge
technologies and concepts, defining programs, and overseeing the development and operation of exploration systems." (n33) The continued shift in this direction was echoed in the Obama Administration's 2010 articulation of the Space Policy
of the United States of America. The second of five guiding principles outlined in the policy states that, "A robust and competitive commercial space sector is vital to continued progress in space. The United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating
the growth of a U.S. commercial space sector that supports U.S. needs, is globally competitive, and advances U.S. leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven
entrepreneurship." (n34) The first of seven goals for the policy is stated as to "energize competitive domestic industries to participate in global markets and advance the development of satellite manufacturing, satellite-based
services, space launch, terrestrial applications and increased entrepreneurship." (n35) The document also contains an entire page of commercial space guidelines to be followed by U.S. goverment departments and
agencies, stating that "United States space activities are conducted in three distinct but interdependent sectors: commercial, civil and
national security." (n36). A copy of the National Space Policy of the United States can be accessed at
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.
Efforts at developing a commercial crew capability are now entering into a crucial phase and will be discussed at greater length in part two of the essay, especially since a three-year
lead time is required for acquiring space for U.S. astronauts on Soviet craft if U.S. efforts are delayed or not successful. Also to be discussed in the August article will be questions which continue to be raised about U.S. space policy, including
whether or not a visit to an asteroid in 2025 is or is not a suitable goal for exploration.
Much of the discussion to this point has centered on what is referred to as low-earth orbit (LEO), the part of space in which the ISS orbits and the shuttles flew their missions. Little mention is made in NASA materials, however, of what may emerge as a second sector within the
commercial spaceflight industry, an area which sits at the nexus of aerospace and space - suborbital flight. Low-earth orbit is generally considered to be an orbit between a distance of about 160 km (~ 100 miles) and 2000 km (~ 1200 miles) above the Earth's surface. (The ISS is in orbit at about 400 km (~ 250 miles) above the Earth's surface.)
A suborbital flight generally reaches an altitude at or above about 100 km (~ 62 miles) from the Earth's suface but does not enter orbit or complete an orbital rotation and comes back down to earth. A "suborbital trajectory" is defined in U.S. Code (49 U.S.C. Sec. 70101 (20) [2004]) as the flight path of a launch vehicle, re-entry vehicle, or any portion
thereof whose vacuum instantaneous impact point does not leave the surface of the earth" (meaning that a flight on this trajectory comes back to earth, as opposed to going into and staying in orbit).
If there is one event which might be pointed to as the genesis of the possiblity of suborbital flight emerging as a segment of the commercial space industry, it would probably be the awarding of the
$10 million Ansari X Prize (http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize) in 2004. The prize, awarded to the first team to build and launch a spacecraft capable of carrying weight equivalent to three people to 100 km above the earth's surface twice in
two weeks, was won by the Scaled Composites (www.scaled.com) team led by aerospace designer Burt Rutan and financier Paul Allen. Their vehicle, SpaceShipOne (pictured below), "was carried by an aeroplane up to nearly 50,000 feet . . . from where it was released into a glide and then
propelled vertically for 80 seconds by a rocket motor to an altitude of more than 62 miles at apogee, reaching a speed over Mach 3. Then falling back to return to earth, it re-entered the atmosphere and glided during 15 - 20 minutes before landing back on the runway of departure." (n39).
SpaceShipOne glides down for approach to the Mojave airport. Photo credit: Courtesy of Scaled Composites, LLC.
In that same year (2004) Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to license and regulate commercial human space flight. However, the law also prohibited federal regulation of commercial human spaceflight companies -
operating either suborbital or orbital commercial launch systems - for eight years (through December 2012). This has since been extended to October 2015. "The premise of the prohibition was rooted in the concern that the industry did not yet exist, thus the Department of Transportation . . . had no relevant experience upon which to
regulate industry practices. During this period it was anticipated that space launch companies would experiment with various designs and processes as they endeavored to develop vehicles and demonstrate their safety and performance capabilities prior to offering licensed suborbital (or orbital) flight. (n40) This will be discussed
at greater length in Part 2 of the summer essay series.
With the apparent shift of NASA to transfer much of low-earth orbit operations to the private sector, and with no formal plans in place by NASA to return to the moon, it is perhaps even becoming possible to think of lunar travel as future destination for
commercial spaceflight or exploration. The X Prize Foundation is in the midst of competition for the $30 million Google Lunar X Prize (www.googlelunarxprize.org), a prize the organization refers to as "the largest international incentive
of all time." (n41) Thirty million dollars in prizes will be available to the first (at least 90 percent) privately funded teams to safely land a robot on the surface of the moon, have it travel 500 meters and send back images and data to the earth. The competition is scheduled to be
completed by 2015, and more information plus a list of active teams is available on the Google Lunar X Prize website.
In testimony at Congressional hearings last year, Capt. Wilbur C. Trafton, Chairman of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), said that "The commercial space industry represents the spirit and roots of America - exploration and entrepreneurship. The commercial
industry plays an important role in stimulating investment in infrastructure and creating opportunity, jobs, and ultimately a U.S. capability, increasing value to the U.S. taxpayer. This role is increasingly important as commercial space passenger travel emerges as a new
business." (n42). Please come back next month to learn more!
FOOTNOTES
- The following are the footnotes indicated in the text in parentheses
with the letter "n" and a number. If you click the asterisk at the end of
the footnote, it will take you back to the paragraph where you left
off.
n1 - Committee on NASA's Strategic Direction, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council of the National Academies, NASA's Strategic Direction and the
Need for a National Consensus. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2012, p. 1. Available online at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18248. (*)
n2 - MacGregor, Robert R. "Imagining an Aerospace Agency in the Atomic Age," in Dick, Steven J., editor, NASA's First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives, NASA SP 2010-4704, Washington, D.C.:
NASA/U.S. GPO, p. 31. (*)
n3 - Schefter, James. The Race: The Uncensored Story of How America Beat Russia to the Moon. New York: Doubleday, 1999, p. 24. (*)
n4 - National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568. (*)
n6 - Krige, John, "NASA's International Relations in Space," in NASA's First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives, NASA SP 2010-4704, Washington, D.C.:
NASA/U.S. GPO, pp. 115, 116 - 118. (*)
n8 - Dick, Steven J., "Exploration, Discovery and Culture: NASA's Role in History," in NASA's First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives, NASA SP 2010-4704, Washington, D.C.:
NASA/U.S. GPO, p. 602. (*)
n9 - Kay, W.D., Defining NASA: The Historical Debate Over the Agency's Mission. Albany, N.Y.: State University of
Albany Press, 2005, p. 112. (*)
n11 - Logsdon, John M., "Fifty Years of Human Spaceflight: Why is There Still a Controversy?" in NASA's First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives, NASA SP 2010-4704, Washington, D.C.:
NASA/U.S. GPO, p. 276. (*)
n12 - Interview with John Erlichman by John M. Logsdon, 6 May 1983, in NASA history office as included in Kay, W.D., Defining NASA, p. 112. (*)
n13 - Reagan, Ronald. 1984 "State of the Union" address, as appears in Kay, W.D., Defining NASA, p. 141. (*)
n15 - Viewed online July 2013 at http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/partners_agreement.html. (*)
n16 - Chaplain, Cristina T., "NASA: Significant Challenges Remain for Access, Use and Sustainment of the International Space Station," testimony in Securing the
Promise of the International Space Station, hearing before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, March 28, 2012, Serial No. 112-72. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2012,
p. 33. (*)
n17 - Gerstenmaier, William, testimony in Securing the
Promise of the International Space Station, hearing before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, March 28, 2012, Serial No. 112-72. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2012,
p. 15.(*)
n18 - Chaplain, Cristina T., testimony, p. 34. (*)
n23 - Bush, George W., "A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration," January 14, 2004, in NASA, The Vision for Space
Exploration, Washington, D.C.: NASA, February 2004. Available online (viewed July 2013) at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_space_exploration2.pdf. (*)
n25 - Cooke, Douglas, testimony in A Review of NASA's Exploration Program in Transition: Issues for Congress and Industry, hearing
before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2011, Serial No. 112-8, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2011,
p. 27. (*)
n26 - White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: White House, June 28, 2010, p. 3. (*)
n28 - Examining NASA's Development on the Space Launch System and Orion Crew Capsule, hearing before the Subcomittee on Space and Aerospace, Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, September 12, 2012, Serial No. 112-102, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2012, p. 2. (*)
n29 - Gerstenmaier, William H., testimony/prepared statement in NASA's Commercial Cargo Providers: Are They Ready to Supply the Space Station in the Post-Shuttle
Era?, hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aerospace, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 1st Session, May 26, 2011, Serial No. 112-20, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2011,
pp. 23 - 24. (*)
n30 - Chaplain, Cristina, testimony, p. 8, Footnote 15. (*)
n31 - Gerstenmaier, William H., testimony/prepared statement, p. 24. (*)
n32 - Gerstenmaier, William H., testimony in Securing the Promise of the ISS: Challenges and Opportunities, hearing before the Committee
on Space, Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, March 28, 2012, Serial No. 112-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO 2012,
p. 5. (*)
n33 - U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Norman Augustine, chairman, Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, October 2009, pp. 13 - 14. (*)
n34 - White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America, p. 3. (*)
n37 - An Overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, hearing before the Committee on Science, Space
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, March 7, 2012, Serial No. 112-68, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2012, p. 1. (*)
n39 - Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Concept of Suborbital Flights: Information from the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), March 19, 2010, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.9. Viewed online July 2013 at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2010_CRP09E.pdf. (*)
n40 - An Overview of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation's Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 112-70, Background Information, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO
2012, p. 4. (*)
n41 - "Help the Earth. Explore The Moon." Google Lunar X-Prize publicity postcard information, received May 2013. (*)
n42 - Captain Wilbur C. Trafton, prepared statement in An Overview of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation's Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, p. 25. (*)
LINKS LIST - The following is a list of links found in the essay.
1. NASA Glossary - http://science.nasa.gov/glossary
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) - http://www.nasa.gov
3. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, original text - http://www.dorothyswebsite.org/spaceact.pdf
4. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended - http://history.nasa.gov/spaceact-leghistory.pdf
5. U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs - http://www.unoosa.org
6. U.N., Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) - http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html
7. International Space Station (ISS) assembly video - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgfWH3g9kpY
8. ISS main NASA website - http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/index.html
9. ISS Interactive Reference Guide - http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/ISSRG
10. NASA Interactive Global Exploration Roadmap - http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/globalexplorationroadmap
11. National Space Policy of the United States of America - http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf
12. "The Future Brought To You By NASA" Interactive Future Technology page - http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/OCT_Interactive_Roadmaps/OCT_Interactive_Roadmaps.html
13. Ansari X Prize - http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize
14. Scaled Composites - http://www.scaled.com
15. Google Lunar X Prize - http://www.googlelunarxprize.org
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